01 / CONSEQUENCE REPORT
GUARD FROM THIS DEPENDENCY.
Develops the institution-specific consequence position: what the dependency puts under pressure, which exposures or decisions it connects, and what the institution should guard.
€25KFIXED
MONACO 2026 · RDM-03EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE IN.DEPENDENCY OUT.
1,500 MW
July 2024 load loss
1,800 MW
February 2025 load loss
Level 3
NERC alert, 4 May 2026
UNPROVEN
Insured consequence
THE GRID MECHANISM IS REAL.
BOTH DOWNSTREAM CLAIMS ARE TESTS.
| Status | Public evidence | What it supports | What it does not support |
|---|---|---|---|
| OBSERVED | NERC's incident review records approximately 1,500 MW of simultaneous voltage-sensitive load reduction in the Eastern Interconnection on 10 July 2024 following a transmission fault. | Large computational / power-electronic loads can disconnect or transfer simultaneously at scale. | It does not establish a catastrophic outage or insured loss. |
| OBSERVED | NERC's 2026 filing materials identify a second Virginia event in February 2025 involving approximately 1,800 MW of load loss. | The mechanism is not a one-off observation. | Frequency alone does not establish reinsurance relevance. |
| REGULATORY RESPONSE | NERC issued a Level 3 Computational Load Alert on 4 May 2026, calling for changes to modelling, studies, monitoring, commissioning, operations, protection and control. | The reliability concern is consequential enough to drive industry action. | A reliability alert is not evidence of insured accumulation. |
| INFERRED | Reinsurers publicly write multiple lines and treaty relationships that can share geography and critical infrastructure dependencies. | A common external trigger could, in principle, connect exposures otherwise managed separately. | This is not evidence that a specific reinsurer actually has such a concentration. |
| HYPOTHESIS | The reliability response around computational loads creates new operational, modelling, assurance and risk-transfer needs across multiple institutional surfaces. | A structural dependency can create commercially testable intervention points. | It does not establish that any particular product, service, venture or market will succeed. |
The source material is public. The dependency is the translated output: a bounded model of the connection, its propagation, its evidence limits and the reinsurance decisions it may change.
DISCOVER
Generate candidate dependency mechanisms from public evidence.
CHALLENGE
Attack the candidate with contradiction, prior art, separability and falsifiability tests.
RATIFY
Promote only a surviving mechanism.
MAP
Map the ratified dependency mechanism onto the public surface, its functions and decision boundaries without claiming knowledge of internal portfolios or models.
RDM-03 IS A RATIFIED EXTERNAL GRID DEPENDENCY MECHANISM. ITS REINSURANCE CONSEQUENCE AND OPPORTUNITY REMAIN INSTITUTION-SPECIFIC TESTS.
Public evidence establishes the mechanism. The commissioned report develops what it means for the specific institution. Ratification applies to the mechanism, not to insured consequence or buyer-specific relevance. Evidence states remain distinct: OBSERVED · MODELLED · INFERRED · UNPROVEN.
CONSEQUENCE and OPPORTUNITY remain separate reports. GUARD and CREATE are the simple decision layer. Commission either report on its own, or both against the same RDM-03 evidence base.
02 / OPPORTUNITY REPORT
CREATE WITH THIS DEPENDENCY.
Develops the institution-specific opportunity position: what recognising the dependency could help create across decisions, products, services, structures, capabilities or market position.
€25KFIXED
03 / BOTH
GUARD + CREATE WITH THIS DEPENDENCY
Two complete positions from one dependency and shared evidence base: what the institution should guard, and what it could create.
€40KFIXED / SAVE €10K
BOTH · €40K →